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Abstract. Learning from a partner who collects higher payoff is a frequently used
working hypothesis in evolutionary game theory. One of the alternative dynamical
rules is when the focal player prefers to follow the strategy choice of the majority in the
local neighborhood, which is often called as conformity-driven strategy update. In this
work we assume that both strategy learning methods are present and compete for space
within the framework of a coevolutionary model. Our results reveal that the presence
of payoff-driven strategy learning method becomes exclusive for high succer’s payoff
and/or high temptation values that represent a snowdrift game dilemma situation. In
general, however, the competition of the mentioned strategy learning methods could be
useful to enlarge the parameter space where only cooperators prevail. This success of
cooperation is based on the enforced coordination of cooperator players which reveals
the benefit of the latter strategy. Interestingly, the payoff-based and the conformity-
based cooperator players can form an effective alliance against defectors that can also
extend the parameter space of full cooperator solution in the stag-hunt game region.
Our work highlights that the coevolution of strategies and individual features such as
learning method can provide novel type of pattern formation mechanism that cannot
be observed in a static model, hence remains hidden in traditional models.
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1. Introduction
According to the evolutionary concept of game theory the fitness (payoff) of a particular
strategy depends on its frequency in the population [1]. During a selection mechanism
this strategy becomes more or less popular depending on its success comparing to other
competitor strategies. This protocol can be implemented easily via a learning process
in which a player may adopt the strategy of a competitor if the latter can reach a higher
payoff value [2, 3, 4]. Naturally, this implementation allows us to extend the potential
target systems from biology to more complex human populations where learning from
others is an essential way to build highly cooperative societies [5].
Humans, however, are not only motivated to reach a higher payoff when making a
decision who to follow during an elementary change. For example, conformity is a well-
documented and frequently observed attitude among humans [6, 7]. In the latter case
a player prefers to follow the behavior of the majority of neighboring partners, which is
partly motivated by the fear to avoid too risky individual choice. Notably, conformity
also plays an important role in opinion dynamics [8, 9]. Previous works already proposed
the simultaneous presence of payoff-driven and conformity-driven strategy learning
methods, but all of them assumed a fixed ratio of these learning protocols and explored
how the collective behavior depends on this ratio [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15].
In the present work we assume that this ratio is flexible and we allow the
mentioned learning protocols to compete for space. This extension has several practical
motivations. First, it helps us to identify the specific conditions which make one of the
learning protocols to be exclusive as a result of an evolutionary process. Second, such
kind of coevolutionary model, where not only strategies but also learning attitudes can
be exchanged between players, may offer new ways how strategies compete. Indeed,
conformity or payoff-driven learning protocol may prevail the whole system at specific
parameter values. Furthermore, in some cases these strategy learning protocols are not
properly competing, but they form a strategy alliance for better evolutionary outcome.
In this way our present observations warrant that the diversity of strategy updating
protocols could be a prime mechanism to maintain cooperation among selfish agents.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. First we proceed with presenting the
details of our coevolutionary model that is followed by the presentation of our main
results. Finally we discuss their wider implications and some potential directions for
future research are also given.
2. Coevolution of strategies and learning protocols
For simplicity we study evolutionary social dilemma games on a square grid, but we
stress that the key observations remain valid if we replace square lattice by other
interaction graphs, including random networks. In the beginning each player is
designated as cooperator or defector with equal probability and pairwise interactions
with neighbors are assumed. Here mutual cooperation yields the reward R, mutual
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defection leads to punishment P , while a cooperator collects a sucker’s payoff S against
a defector who enjoys temptation value T . In agreement with the widely accepted
parametrization of social games we fix R = 1 and P = 0, while the remaining T and S
parameters determine the character of the social dilemma [16, 17]. More precisely, in
case of T > 1 and S > 0 we consider a snowdrift game, but 0 < T < 1 and S < 0 result
in a stag-hunt game situation. For prisoner’s dilemma game T > 1 and S < 0 values
are assumed.
Beside the mentioned strategies a player also possesses a tag, a personal feature
that determines how she learns a strategy from others. In particular, we assume that a
player updates strategy either in a payoff-driven or in a conformity-driven way. In the
former case player x acquires her payoff Πx by playing the particular game with all her
neighbors. Furthermore, player x chooses a neighboring y player randomly who then
also acquires her payoff Πy in a similar way specified above. After player x adopts the
strategy sy from player y with a probability
Γ(Πx −Πy) = {1 + exp[(Πx − Πy)/K]}
−1 , (1)
where K quantifies the uncertainty of strategy adoption. Without loosing generality we
use K = 0.1 that allows us to compare our results with previous findings [18]. If player
x learns in a conformity-driven way then she prefers to adopt the strategy that is most
common in the neighborhood of her interaction range [12]. More precisely, this player
adopts the strategy sx with the probability Γ(Nsx − kh) = {1 + exp[(Nsx − kh)/K]}
−1,
where Nsx is the number of players who represent sx within the interaction range of
focal player x, whereas kh is one half of the degree of player x. As previously, here K
determines the uncertainty of learning process, which makes also possible the adoption
of the strategy of the minority with a small probability. For simplicity we used the
same noise value as for the pairwise imitation step. In the beginning, similarly to the
strategy distribution, each player is designated as a learner using payoff-driven (p) or
conformity-driven (o) motivation with equal probability.
Technically it means that we have a four-state system where a player is payoff-
driven cooperator (pC), payoff-driven defector (pD), conformity-driven cooperator (oC),
or conformity-driven defector (oD). The key feature of our coevolutionary model is that
players may adopt not only strategies from a neighbor, but also the way of learning.
This adoption from player y for player x happens with the probability defined by Eq. 1.
In an elementary Monte Carlo step (MCS) a player is selected for a strategy adoption
and independently for changing the learning method. These adoptions happen with the
probabilities defined above. In a system containing N players a full MCS consists of N
elementary steps, hence on average all players have a chance to change strategy and/or
learning method. All simulation results are obtained on interaction graphs typically
comprising N = 2 · 105 − 8 · 106 nodes where the stationary fractions of different states
are averaged after 105 − 106 MCSs of relaxation. The final results are averaged over
100 independent realizations for each set of parameter values.
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Figure 1. Full T − S phase diagram of snowdrift game where payoff-driven and
conformity-driven strategy learning protocols are competing for space. Red solid lines
denote continuous phase transitions, while blue dashed line denotes first-order phase
transition. Full C (full D) label marks the parameter regions where only cooperator
(defector) strategies survive in the stationary state. “Payoff-driven” label marks the
region where payoff-driven strategy learning protocol prevails and related cooperator
and defector players form a stable winning solution. The phase denoted by “mixed”
label shows where all learning protocols and all strategies coexist. For comparison,
green dotted line marks the border of full cooperator state when only payoff-driven
learning protocol is available for players in a uniform system.
3. Results
We first present results obtained for the snowdrift game quadrant of T −S plane where
T > 1 and S > 0. The final outcome of the coevolutionary process for different
(T, S) parameter pairs is summarized in the phase diagram plotted in Fig. 1. This
diagram highlights that the region of full cooperator state is extended dramatically
comparing to the basic model where players adopt external strategy only in a payoff-
driven way. For comparison the border of full cooperator phase for the latter case
is marked by dotted green line in the diagram. This comparison underlines that the
application of a coevolutionary rule in the updating protocol can enhance the kingdom
of cooperation even for snowdrift game where it was impossible to detect cooperation
promoting mechanism in the framework of the traditional model [19].
Turning back to the diagram, if T and/or S are too high then payoff-driven strategy
learning protocol becomes exclusive and the system evolves into a state where pC and
pD coexist in a role-separating way that provides optimal total payoff for the population
[20]. Interestingly, there is an island in the parameter space where all the available
states can survive and form a stable solution. This region is denoted by “mixed” label
in the diagram. As expected, if S is too small and T is too high then both types of
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Figure 2. Representative cross sections of the snowdrift phase diagram shown in
Fig. 1, as obtained for S = 0.7 (left panel) and for T = 1.5 (right panel). Depicted
are stationary fractions of four states dependent on temptation T (left) and sucker’s
payoff S (right). Stable solutions are denoted along the top axis. Further description
of emerging phase transitions can be found in the main text.
cooperators die out and only defectors survive.
For a more quantitative description we present two characteristic cross sections of
the diagram in Fig. 2. In the left panel we fixed S = 0.7 and increased the temptation
value gradually. At small T values both types of defectors die out soon and only pC and
oC players survive. Here the system always evolves into a homogeneous state in the long
run, but the likelihood to reach a homogeneous pC or a homogeneous oC state depends on
the initial fractions of these players when neutral coarsening starts [21]. Consequently,
the plotted fractions of oC and pC players in the early full C region show simply the
probability to reach the related homogeneous oC and pC states. As we increase T
the four-state mixed solution emerges, followed by a full cooperator state again, and
finally the coexistence of pC and pD players becomes stable at high T values. While the
emergence and decline of the mixed solution happens via a continuous phase transition
the change from a full C state to a payoff-driven solution is always discontinuous.
In the right panel of Fig. 2 we fixed T = 1.5 and increased the sucker’s payoff
gradually. At small S values cooperator players die out very soon and only pD and
oD players survive. Similarly to the full C state here the system always evolves into
a homogeneous pD or a homogeneous oD state via a slow coarsening. Accordingly,
the plotted fractions of pD and oD denote only the probability to reach the related
homogeneous states. By increasing S the stable coexistence of payoff-driven players
emerges, which is replaced by the full dominance of oC players. This transition is
always discontinuous. Higher S offers a chance for all kind of players to survive that is
followed by the dominance of payoff-driven learning protocol at very high S values.
To get a deeper insight about the pattern formations which resulted in the above
described evolutionary outcomes we present a representative evolution of spatially
distributed players in Fig. 3. Here we do not use the traditional random initial
distribution of available microscopic states, but apply a specially prepared patch-like
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Figure 3. Spatial evolution of the four competing states in a 400 × 400 system at
T = 1.4 and S = 0.4 where the simulation is launched from a prepared patch-like initial
state where all states are distributed in homogeneous domains (not shown). Here dark
(light) blue denotes payoff-driven (conformity-driven) cooperators, while dark (light)
red marks payoff-driven (conformity-driven) defectors, as it is marked by white labels
in panel (a). This panel represents the early stage of evolutionary process after 20
MCSs. Further stages of the evolutionary process are shown at 50, 150, 250, 350, and
800 MCSs. Finally the system evolves into a homogeneous oC state (not shown). The
details of representative pattern formation processes are described in the main text.
state where all kind of interfaces between competing players can be found. In this
way we can monitor all emerging pattern formations simultaneously via a single run.
The starting state, where all borders are flat between homogeneous patches, is not
shown, but panel (a) of Fig. 3 shows an early stage of evolutionary process. This panel
illustrates nicely that the flat border between oD and oC remains practically frozen, as
it is highlighted by a white ellipse and marked by “1”, because both strategies support
their akin players at the front by ensuring the majority of similar strategies around
them. Similarly, the border between oD and pD domains, denoted by ellipse “2” and
the border between oC and pC players (ellipse “3”) do not really propagate, but just
fluctuate due to a neutral voter-model like slow coarsening. Alternatively, the interface
between pC and pD domains, marked by ellipse “4”, starts diffusing intensively yielding
a stable coexistence between these players. Note that in a two-player subsystem, which
is identical to the traditional payoff-driven uniform system, these players would coexist
at these T − S values.
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Interestingly, new states emerge at the front between pD and oC domain, which were
not initially present. On one hand pD adopts the conformity attitude from oC because
the latter reaches higher payoff and becomes oD, shown by ellipse “5”. On the other
hand, pD may adopt the strategy of oC and becomes pC , as it is illustrated by ellipse “6”.
However, due to the neutral relation between defector states the emerging oD cannot
spread in the bulk of pD, but stick at the original border of oC and pD , as it is shown
by ellipse “7” in panel (b) of Fig. 3. Noteworthy, pD players can enter into the bulk of
pC players and build up a stable coexistence, as shown by ellipse “8” in panel (b). In
this way the original border between pD and oC serves as a source of emerging pC + pD
solution which invades the pure pD domain - this is nicely demonstrated by ellipse “9”
in panel (c).
Similarly to the above discussed case, the missing two microscopic states can also
emerge at the original border of pC and oD domains. First, pC cannot reach really high
payoff at the border, but oD is less vulnerable no matter her low payoff because she
learns in a conformity-driven way. As a result, pC may change to pD state by learning
the strategy of oD, as highlighted by ellipse “10” in panel (a). After, as described
previously, the emerging pD state can form a viable coexistence with pC players, hence
the pC + pD solution starts forming again. This is illustrated by ellipse “11” in panel
(c). Speaking about the fourth state, oC can also emerge at the original border of oD
and pC because the fluctuating and highly disordered border may allow oD players to
follow the strategy of pC and become oC . This process is marked by ellipse “12” in
panel (a). While the latter state remains viable, but its spread into the bulk of the
pD+pC solution is much slower than the propagation of pC +pD solution in the original
dark blue domain. (The slow growth of oC phase in pC+pD solution is marked by ellipse
“13” in panels (b,c,d) and (e)).
Summing up our observations, in the snowdrift quadrant practically the pC + pD
solution fights against the oC state. This is nicely demonstrated in panel (e) of Fig. 3,
where both solutions have already won their local battles and only these solutions
survive to fight further for the final triumph. Since oC players follow conformity-biased
learning protocol the enforced homogeneity of cooperation provides a highly competitive
payoff that could be attractive for payoff-driven competitors. As a result, they become
conformist easily. Contrarily, homogeneous oD domain cannot offer high payoff for
payoff-driven players and the latter group stays at their original learning protocol. In
this way the coevolution of payoff-driven and conformity-driven protocols can break the
original symmetry of conformity-driven strategies, where both uniform destinations are
possible, and pave the way for a full cooperator state that would be unreachable for the
traditional model of uniform payoff-driven dynamics at such a high temptation value.
(The final evolutionary outcome, which is a homogeneous oC state, is not shown in our
figure, but can be monitored in the animation provided in Ref. [22].)
Our argument that makes clear the broader appearance of full cooperator state can
also explain why payoff-driven solution becomes dominant for high S and/or high T
values. In the latter cases the collective payoff of role-separating pC + pD coexistence
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Figure 4. Stationary distribution of different microscopic states obtained at T = 1.5
for S = 0.65, 0.75 and 0.82 from left to right. The color coding of different microscopic
states are identical to those applied in Fig. 3. Namely, dark (light) blue denotes
payoff-driven (conformity-driven) cooperators, while dark (light) red marks payoff-
driven (conformity-driven) defectors. The pC + pD domains become more and more
dominant as we increase S and above a threshold value this solution prevails in the
whole space. Similar behavior may be detected at fixed S as we gradually increase the
value of T . Linear system size is L = 400.
can reach the competitive payoff of oC domains. Consequently payoff-driven players
can survive and they become dominant as we increase T or S further. The latter is
illustrated in Fig. 4, where we plotted three representative snapshots of the stationary
state for three different S values where all microscopic states are present in the “mixed”
phase. These plots highlight that the pC + pD solution gradually crowd out oC state as
we increase S and becomes exclusive above a critical value of S. Notably, as we already
discussed above, the interface between oC and pC + pD domains offers a chance for oD
state to emerge which explains the presence of all available microscopic states in the
“mixed” phase. Last, we note that similar behavior can also be reached at fixed S by
increasing T only, because the competitive payoff for pC + pD solution can be ensured
in the latter way, too.
Turning to the prisoner’s dilemma quadrant of T − S plane, the application of our
coevolutionary model cannot yield notably different results from the classical case when
players apply payoff-driven learning method uniformly [16]. More precisely, both oC and
pC players die out soon after we launch the evolution from a random initial state and
only defectors survive. In other words, deep in the prisoner’s dilemma quadrant when
T > 1 and S < 0 the coevolution of different learning methods cannot yield additional
help for cooperators to survive.
The evolutionary outcome, however, is more interesting in the stag-hunt quadrant
where T < 1 and S < 0. Here in the classic case either defectors or cooperators prevail
depending on the actual T −S values [20]. This evolutionary outcome remains valid for
the present coevolutionary model, but now cooperators can dominate larger parameter
areas from defectors. This is illustrated in Fig. 5 where the full cooperator and full
defector states are separated by a discontinuous phase transition. For comparison we
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Figure 5. Full T − S phase diagram of stag-hunt game where payoff-driven and
conformity-driven strategy learning collaborate to beat defectors. Dashed blue line
shows the border of full cooperator and full defector phases. For comparison dotted
green line shows the same border for the classic model when only payoff-driven strategy
learning is used.
have also plotted the same border line in the case when only payoff-driven strategy
learning is used by the players. The comparison suggests that in the coevolutionary
case there is a significant area of T − S plane where the direction of the evolutionary
process can be reversed and a full cooperator state is reached instead of full defection
destination.
To understand the origin of this remarkably different outcome we present a series of
snapshots of evolution starting from a prepared initial state at T = 0.89 and S = −0.3.
In the initial state, shown in panel (a) of Fig. 6, players using payoff-driven learning
method are distributed randomly in the left side of the space while players using
conformity-driven strategy learning method are distributed on the right side. The early
stage after the evolution is launched can be seen in panel (b). It suggests that pD
players can easily beat pC players and the final outcome of this subsystem would be
a full defector state. (The last surviving dark blue domain of pC players in the sea of
dark red pD players goes extinct in panel (d).) Notably, the evolution in the right side
is different because the strategy-neutral conformity-driven microscopic rule would allow
both destinations of uniform states. In this sub-system the curvature-driven coarsening
determines how domains become larger and larger by eliminating the peaks and bulges
from the interfaces separating homogeneous oC and oD domains. Consequently, small
islands are always shrinking in the bulk of a larger domain. Only straight frontiers may
be stable temporarily but their edges, where the curvature is relevant, are also unstable.
The vicinity of payoff-driven players, however, breaks the original symmetry of oC and
oD states. Since payoff-driven players are mostly defectors, neighboring conformity-
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Figure 6. Spatial evolution starting from a random initial state where players are
separated according to their learning methods. The color code of different states are
identical to the case we used in Fig. 3. In panel (a) the 400 × 400 system is divided
into two halves, where left side is occupied by payoff-driven players while the right side
is occupied by conformity-driven players. First, red color defectors seem to dominate,
but after the winning oC + pC (mixture of light and dark blue colors) alliance emerges
in panel (d) and the direction of evolution is reversed. Finally the system terminates
onto a full C state (not shown) that is unreachable for classic model at the applied
T = 0.89, and S = −0.3 parameter pair. The different stages of the evolutionary
process are shown at 20, 600, 2100, 5500, and 11500 MCSs, respectively. Further
details of emerging pattern formation are given in the main text.
driven players will also prefer defector strategy. As a result, light-blue oC domains
would gradually disappear and defection seems to be a victor in both sub-systems.
Interestingly, however, the mixture of oC and pC players (light and dark blue) can
form an effective alliance against defectors. While oC , surrounded by other cooperators,
is less vulnerable against pD players, pC can also utilize that oD players need a regular
interface for invasion. In the absence of it the latter becomes also susceptible to the
vicinity of pC players. These two effects altogether establish an effective alliance of
different types of cooperator strategies, who can gradually prevail in the whole system
(the final destination to a full cooperator state is not shown in Fig. 6, but can be
monitored in the animation provided in Ref. [23]). It is worth noting that the mixture
of oD and pD players cannot form similar effective alliance because pD state cannot
utilize the vicinity of oD players.
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4. Discussion
In this work we have studied the coevolution of competing strategies and their learning
methods. Beside the broadly applied payoff-driven imitation dynamics we have also
assumed players to use conformity-driven learning and allowed them to change their
learning protocols in time. The proper coevolution revealed significantly different
behaviors from those cases when we just apply the mentioned learning methods
simultaneously in a static way via an external control parameter. In the latter cases
players can only vary their strategies during the evolution [15, 24, 25, 26]. In other
words, the significance of present study is to reveal the qualitatively different pattern
formation mechanisms that we can only observe in a coevolutionary framework.
We have shown that there are parameter regions, like strong snowdrift game
situations at high T or high S values where the competition of different learning
methods results in the unambiguous victor of payoff-driven strategy learning. Here
the role separating cooperator-defector pairs provide so high collective payoff value
that cannot be beaten by a homogeneous domain which would be a consequence of a
conformity-driven learning method. Nevertheless, for less sharp snowdrift game regions
at smaller T and S values the coevolution of different learning methods is useful to reach
a full cooperative state that would not be reachable otherwise. In the latter case the
homogeneous cooperator domains can invade the whole space by enjoying the advantage
of conformity-driven learning method.
Interestingly, in the stag-hunt game region the simultaneous presence of different
learning methods reveals a novel way of collaboration that cannot be observed otherwise.
Here conformity-driven cooperators can resist the invasion of payoff-driven defectors
and neighboring payoff-driven cooperators can attack conformity-driven defectors
successfully. The expected symmetry is broken for defectors because oD and pD states
cannot form similarly efficient alliance. In this way the active partnership of different
types of cooperator players allows them to extend the full cooperator state to those
parameter values which belonged to the sovereignty of defectors in the classic payoff-
driven model.
The diversity of players has already been proved to be useful to maintain
cooperation in harsh environment where defection would prevail in a homogeneous
population [27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37]. Our present observations underline
that this concept can be extended more generally in a coevolutionary framework
[17, 38, 39, 40, 41] where the evolution either select one of the learning methods to
prevail or allows coexistense by offering new solutions to emerge. Hopefully our extention
can be useful for other kind of microscopic rules, including win-stay lose-shift, myopic,
other-regarding preference, Pavlov-rule, or in general for those rules which use a sort of
aspiration level for personal decision making [42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52,
53, 54].
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